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Characterizing Incommensurability on the
basis of a contextual theory of language
Conditions of Application and Inferential Relations
in M. Carrier’s Reconstruction of Incommensurability
Léna Soler
LPHS, Nancy, France
Résumé : l’article, tout d’abord critique certains aspects de la manière dont
Martin Carrier caractérise l’incommensurabilité sémantique à partir d’une
théorie contextuelle du langage, puis introduit des distinctions et fait des
propositions en vue de poursuivre le même projet. On soutient que deux
conceptions diﬀérentes de la notion de ‘conditions d’application’, et corréla-
tivement deux acceptions distinctes de la clause ‘préservation des relations in-
férentielles’, sont à l’œuvre dans la caractérisation de Carrier, et que sa thèse
centrale ne tient que grâce aux déplacements de sens correspondants. On sug-
gère de remplacer cette thèse — selon laquelle les concepts incommensurables
sont ceux qui sont intraduisibles au sens spéciﬁque où ils ont soit mêmes con-
ditions d’application soit mêmes relations inférentielles mais jamais les deux
à la fois –, par une caractérisation qui, d’un point de vue méthodologique,
accorde une primauté aux relations inférentielles. Cette caractérisation est
pour l’essentiel constituée : d’une part de la thèse (kuhnienne) selon laquelle
les concepts incommensurables sont avant tout ceux qui présentent des rela-
tions inférentielles largement non superposables ; d’autre part d’une analyse
des liens existant entre relations inférentielles et conditions d’application, en
particulier d’une réﬂexion sur les conditions auxquelles certaines relations in-
férentielles peuvent et doivent être identiﬁées à des conditions d’application.
Abstract: In this article I present, ﬁrst, a criticism of certain aspects of the
way Martin Carrier characterizes semantic incommensurability on the basis of
Philosophia Scientiæ, 8 (1), 2004, 107–152.
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a contextual theory of language. Subsequently I introduce some distinctions
and put forward some proposals in order to pursue the same project. It will
be argued that two diﬀerent conceptions of the notion “conditions of applica-
tions” and, correlatively, two diﬀerent meanings of the clause “preservations of
the inferential relations”, are involved in Carrier’s characterisation, and that
his central tenet holds only thanks to the corresponding meaning-shifts. Ac-
cording to Carrier’s thesis, the incommensurable concepts are those that are
untranslatable in the following speciﬁc sense: they have either the same con-
ditions of application or the same inferential relations, but they never satisfy
both determinants at the same time. I suggest to replace this thesis by a
characterisation that, from a methodological point of view, grants logical pri-
ority to the inferential relations. This characterisation is mainly based: on one
side on the Kuhnian claim that the incommensurable concepts are those who
have largely non superimposable inferential relations; on the other side on an
analysis of the links between inferential relations and conditions of applica-
tion, particularly on a reﬂection concerning the conditions under which some
inferential relations can and should be equated with conditions of application.
Incommensurability is one of the most controversial issues of 20th
century philosophy of science1. It has to be said that lack of clarity af-
fecting so many discussions about the incommensurability problem tends
to hide the real difficulties that we encounter when we try to characterize
precisely what is at stake. In this landscape, the work of Martin Car-
rier (MC) provides a welcomed, painstaking and stimulating attempt to
characterize semantic incommensurability and its epistemological conse-
quences2.
MC gave two talks on the topic in France in March 2003, first in
Nancy, at the Poincaré Archives, and then in Paris, in the seminar on
incommensurability that I direct at the International College of Phi-
losophy. I learned a lot from these talks and from the live discussions
surrounding them. The present paper is a very extended version of the
short commentary of MC’s talk that I presented in Nancy. As every
philosophical work, it includes also critical remarks: without any doubt,
this seems to me the best way to pay homage to MC’s work.
In this paper I will, to start with, bring to the foreground a few
points: I will state (here without further justification) a few fundamen-
1See [Hoyningen 1989]; [Sankey 1994]; [Hoyningen & Sankey 2001].
2Cf. [Carrier 2000], [Carrier 2001] and [Carrier 2002], in addition to the paper
contained in the present book. The critical analysis I will propose here is not just
about the later paper: it aims to cover MC’s different contributions to the incom-
mensurability problem.
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tal assumptions, that seem to me, after many years of research on the
topic, to be required in order to achieve a deep and articulated charac-
terization of semantic incommensurability. This will make possible to
emphasize some fundamental points of agreement between MC and me,
since we converge about the very essentials, and will at the same time
provide the framework for further discussion. In a second moment, I
will discuss some aspects of MC’s work with which I feel uncomfortable.
And in a third moment, I will suggest some ways in order to refine the
characterization of incommensurability according to the same project.
The reader will find a list of notations at the end of the paper.
1. Some fundamental assumptions in order to under-
stand the incommensurability/commensurability prob-
lem
First, I of course assume, in agreement with MC’s work (and in opposi-
tion to the thesis that incommensurability is an invention of philosophers
of science), that semantic incommensurability is a real and historically
instantiated phenomenon.
Second I think, as MC does, that we must rely on actual historical
cases to elaborate and test our characterization of incommensurability
(even if disagreements can of course arise about what ‘actual historical
cases’ are and tell us).
Third I think, with MC, that semantic incommensurability names a
deep conceptual restructuring. That is, we admit that there are indeed
scientific revolutions, that revolutions are deep conceptual reorganisa-
tions, and that incommensurability labels the relations, to be character-
ized, between the initial and the final conceptual frameworks.
Forth, we agree that to admit revolutions and incommensurability is
not to say that there is nothing in common between the two theories
considered. Indeed, there are significant common points. More: there
must be significant common points; otherwise, we would not consider the
two theories as rival incommensurable theories, but as theories pertain-
ing to two different disciplines, coping with different realms of objects,
and in that case, incommensurability would not raise any epistemologi-
cal problems (in particular, it would not have appeared to threat theory
comparison and realism). I think that this is a very important point, em-
phasized by MC in his papers, and also developed in some of my works3.
In brief incommensurability, if it is to be of epistemological interest, has
3Cf. MC’s paper, section 6; cf. also the analyses of MC, and the references he gave
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to label very deep differences arising in the context of subsisting common
points between successive theories. To characterize the very nature of
these common points is an important aspect of the incommensurability
problem.
Fifth I assume, again in full agreement with MC, that in order to be
able to characterize incommensurability, we need to rely on a theory of
language. Of course, this does not imply that science can be reduced to
language and that incommensurability can be seen as a purely linguistic
phenomenon. Rather, what is stressed is that that human science always
involves language (ordinary, specialized, or mathematical) and that sci-
entific revolutions indeed involve linguistic changes. Therefore, we must
examine closely these linguistic changes and, for this purpose, we need
a theory of language.
Sixth, I am convinced, as is MC, that the required linguistic theory
has to be a contextual, holistic one. In other words, we acknowledge
that science works as a system and that there are structural aspects
of scientific practices, and we focus on the linguistic dimension of this
assumption. Few years ago, I tried to understand incommensurability
with the aid of a theory inspired by Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural
linguistic4. Now I think that MC’s attempt to rely on a contextual theory
inspired by Wittgenstein, Hanson and W. Sellars is more promising5.
Indeed, MC’s contextual theory seems to be more suitable to take into
account the relations between the linguistic structures and the empirical
world. This is precisely the role played by what MC calls “conditions of
application”.
Seventh, and last, I agree with MC that — as Kuhn himself re-
peatedly pointed out — incommensurable theories are not empirically
incomparable6.
2. Two different notions of “CA” in MC’s analysis:
CA1 and CA2
The distinction between conditions of application (CA) and inferential
relations (IR), and the idea that a good translation must satisfy both
of Feyerabend, Laudan and Papineau in [Carrier 2001, 83-84]. Cf. also [Soler 2003]
and [Barker 2001, 250]. I already stated the problem and stressed its importance in
the introduction.
4[Soler 2000b]. See also [Soler 2004b].
5For a general presentation of the context theory of meaning drawing on such
references, see [Carrier 2001, 66-67].
6Although incommensurable theories generate special difficulties, that have to be
taken into account, concerning the task of empirical comparison.
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criteria, are at the heart of MC’s characterization of incommensurability.
Indeed, according to MC’s central tenet, incommensurable concepts are
untranslatable concepts, in the sense that they fail to satisfy at the same
time the two conditions imposed on translation, namely, ‘sameness of
CA’ and ‘sameness of IR’.
The translation failure of incommensurable concepts arises from the im-
possibility to jointly fulﬁl the two conditions of adequacy that the context
theory places on translation. Would be conceptual analogues either fail
to maintain the conditions of application or to reproduce the concomitant
inferential relations. [Carrier 2001, 77].
The exam of typical examples7
suggest that the type of conﬂict emerging here is a general feature of in-
commensurability [Carrier 2001, 77].
In brief, MC’s definition of incommensurability can be schematically
captured by the formula:
Either [(same CA) and non(same IR)],
or [(same IR) and non(same CA)].
By analysing the problem of incommensurability with the aid of these
distinctions, MC helps us to take a great step forward. However, there
is still some work to be done about these distinctions.
The first aspect concerns the notion of ‘CA’. This notion is impor-
tant, because it has the function to help us to understand how a theory
is connected to the world. Thus we absolutely need a notion of this kind.
However, it seems to me that different senses of the notion of ‘CA’ are in-
volved in MC’s developments, both at the level of general definitions and
at the level of the application to particular historical cases. Although
it is true that these senses are related, I believe that it is important to
explore their differences and to render explicit their mutual relations.
First of all, I want to focus on what seems to me the major shift in
the meaning of ‘CA’, a shift that, I think, has important consequences
for MC’s central conclusion. I will argue that, in what MC names his
“first try” and his “second try”, two different (although related) concepts
are referred to with the same label ‘CA’.
7In addition of the one analysed in the present volume, MC considers in other
papers, other prototypical cases of incommensurable concepts like phlogiston/oxygen,
impetus/moment, or geocentric planet/heliocentric planet.
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Let us call L1 any linguistic item pertaining to theory T1, L2 any
linguistic item involved in theory T2, and so on. By ‘linguistic item’,
I mean a signifier or a group or signifiers forming an expression or a
sentence. Here are some typical examples considered by MC:
Ex1. T1 = Lorentz’s ED; T2 = Einsteinian SR; L1 = L2 = ‘mass’, or
‘length’, or ‘velocity’.
Ex2. T1 = Lorentz’s ED; T2 = Einsteinian SR; L1 = ‘real mass’, L2 =
‘rest mass’.
(ED: electrodynamics; SR: special relativity).
Ex3. T1 = phlogiston theory, T2 = chemistry of Lavoisier; L1 = phlo-
giston ; L2 = oxygen.
Let us consider the first try, that is, translation according to sameness
of CA.
In the first try, MC exhibits two linguistic items L1 of T1 and L2 of
T2 that are said to have the same CA
8. In what sense do they have the
same CA? In the sense that L1 and L2 are related to the same empirical
situations (in the ED/SR example as described by MC, these situations
correspond to identical measurement procedures).
Thus ‘CA of L’ mean ‘empirical situations to which L is related in a
given theoretical context T ’. Let us call this meaning ‘CA in the first
sense’, and let us refer to it as CA1.
Let us now consider the second try, translation according to sameness
of inferential relations.
In his second try, MC exhibits two linguistic items L1 of T1 and L2 of
T2 that are said to have the same IR, and he concludes that such items
have different CA. In what sense do L1 and L2 have different CA?
In order to answer, we have to examine what MC exactly does in
the second try. Roughly speaking, he gives a theoretical definition of L1
(resp. L2): he explains the meaning (the sense) of the concepts used by
the adherents of T1 (resp T2). That is, he makes explicit the relations of
L1 (resp. L2) with (in principle all) other relevant theoretical signifiers
of T1 (resp. T2).
8This is supposed to be the case for L1 = L2 = ‘length’ and L′1 = L
′
2
= ‘velocity’,
in the context of T1 = Lorentz’s ED and T2 = Einsteinian SR (cf. MC’s paper in
the present volume, section 4); or for L1 = ‘phlogiston escape’ and L2 = ‘oxygen
bounding’ in the context T1 = phlogiston theory and T2 = chemistry of Lavoisier
[Carrier 2001, section 6].
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Then he concludes that L1 fails to apply, that L1 does not apply at
all from T2’s point of view. What does it mean in this case? It means
that, from T2’s point of view, concept L1 is “empty”, that L1 “is no
longer legitimately applied to any phenomenon” [839 ]; it means that
“there is no such thing” as what T1 names L1 [Carrier 2002, 136]. In
other words, ‘to apply’, in the context of the second try, is equivalent to
‘to refer’ (according to some determined subject or group of subjects).
L1 ‘fails to apply’ means that L1 does not refer to anything: that what
T1 describes under L1 doesn’t exist according to the adherents of T2.
(And this is so, because the state of affairs that T1 describes under
L1 is incompatible with the state of affairs that T2 describes under T2.
It is not simply that L1 does not exist according to T2; it is, moreover,
that the existence of L1 is inconsistent with T2. What L1 names cannot
coexist with T2: it cannot be peacefully grafted on T2, it is incompatible,
contradictory with T2).
Hence, in the second try, L1 of T1 and L2 of T2 are said to have
different CA, because they cannot both apply in the sense that the
two states of affairs they describe cannot both exist: L1 (resp. L2) is,
according to the adherents of T2 (resp. T1), an empty name, a description
that does not apply to anything, that does not correspond to any real
state of affairs in the physical world10.
Conclusion: in the second try, ‘CA of L’ means ‘existence of the state
of affairs named L’, ‘truth of the statement L’, or, rephrased in a softer
way, ‘empirical adequacy of the description named L’. A linguistic item
L will be thought to apply, to have CA, if it is thought to label an em-
pirically adequate description, a really existing states of affairs, if it is
thought to have a counterpart in reality. Let us call this meaning ‘CA
in the second sense’, and let us refer to it as CA2 (or let us say that
a linguistic item applies2).
A striking way to show that CA1 and CA2 correspond to different
concepts, is to point out that one and the same linguistic item, say L1,
may apply1 but fail to apply2.
9The pages mentioned into brackets without further reference correspond to the
pages of the present volume.
10By the way, the converse holds too, although it is never explicit in MC’s pre-
sentation. Indeed MC, in the second try, always describes the situation from the
point of view of the recent theory, that is, from the point of view of the adherents of
T2. However this has, in principle, no damaging philosophical consequences for MC’s
argument, since the converse can be unproblematically stated in MC’s framework.
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Indeed, suppose that we are adherents of T2; we think that L1 of T1
does not pick out anything in the physical world (that is, fails to apply2).
But nevertheless, we cannot deny that L1 is indeed linked by T1 to
some empirical situations. And if we admit the description involved in
the first try, we admit that L1 is linked by T1 to the same empirical
situations as L2 by T2. In other words, we admit that L1 and L2 have
the same CA1.
Thus, as L2 indeed applies1, we must conclude that L1 applies1 as
well.
Therefore, L2 applies1 and does not apply2.
I think that CA1 and CA2 should be carefully distinguished. Al-
though CA1 is, in my opinion, the most fundamental and useful deter-
minant, we can hope to rely on both CA1 and CA2 in order to achieve
a fined-grained analysis of the incommensurability problem based on a
more complex and precise operational notion of CA.
3. Two different understandings of the clause ‘trans-
lation according to preservation of IR’
I will now consider the notion of IR and the clause ‘preservation of IR’,
arguing that two different interpretations of the clause are involved in
the first and in the second try.
In the first try, L1 of T1 and L2 of T2 are said to have different IR (or
theoretical integration), because the theoretical network at the heart of
which L1 lies in T1, and the theoretical network at the heart of which L2
lies in T2, are two linguistic systems of very different structures, indeed
two incompatible systems (and this is so, as underlined by MC, because
L1 and L2 appear in incompatible laws, and thus in non-overlapping
classes of kinds, in T1 and T2).
Therefore, in the first try, ‘IR of L’ means ‘structure of the theoretical
network surrounding L in T ’, or ‘system of the theoretical relations at
the heart of which L lies in T ’.
Accepting this meaning, it is natural to understand expressions like
‘preservation of the IR of two linguistic items L1 and L2’, as something
like ‘same structure of the theoretical networks associated to L1 in T1
and to L2 in T2’.
And then it is natural to expect that MC’s second try, that is, the
attempt to translate according to the clause ‘preservation of IR’, will
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correspond to the search for linguistic items of T1 and T2 that seem,
prima facie, to lie at the heart of two similarly structured theoretical
networks.
However, this is not what MC looks for in the second try.
Under the heading ‘translation according to preservation of IR’, what
MC does, in his analysis of historical examples, is the following thing:
he associates, to a signifier L2 of T2, a theoretical structure different
from the one usually associated to L2 in T2, a foreign theoretical struc-
ture corresponding to the theoretical network surrounding L1 in T1. In
other words, he “grafts” (as he says himself) the structure of relations
characteristic of L1 in T1 on a linguistic item of T2.
Hence, in MC’s second try, ‘preservation of the IR of L1 from T1
to T2’ means ‘importation in T2, and coordination to L2, of a foreign
theoretical network deducted from the incommensurable rival theory T1
and coordinated to L1 in T1’.
Conclusion: there are two possible ways to understand the clause
‘translation according to preservation of IR’, and two different associated
procedures. Let us mark MC’s procedure in the second try with suffix
2 (to make short: TIR2) and let us mark with suffix 1 the previously
sketched procedure, which is involved in the first try, that is, ‘to look
for linguistic items that have prima facie similar IR’ (to make short:
TIR1).
4. For an other characterization of MC’s second try
I have, so far, successively focused on each constraint upon translation
considered in isolation and examined what it became, first when it is in-
volved in the first try, then when it is involved in the second try. Keeping
the conclusions of these reflections in mind, I want now to switch from
‘constraint entry’ to ‘try entry’: that is, I intend to consider MC’s first
and second tries as two unitary wholes linking together both constraints,
and, examining each unit one after the other, to discuss MC’s description
of them.
MC’s account of his first try seems convincing to me. Roughly speak-
ing11, the first try (t1) shows that in incommensurable theories: (t1a)
there are linguistic items which are grounded in the same empirical sit-
uations (in my vocabulary: which have the same CA1) and which can
11I say ‘roughly speaking’, because, as it will appear, the clause ‘linguistic items
grounded in the same empirical situations’ is indeed vague, and need to be articulated
(see sections 5 and 8).
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then be translated according to this criteria); but (t1b) these linguistic
items do not have the same IR, and then, they do not satisfy the second
criteria (in my vocabulary: they cannot be TIR1).
I’m not so convinced by MC’s account of the second try. More pre-
cisely: what is pointed out in this second try is in itself instructive, but
should be, I think, rephrased in a more adequate vocabulary — and this
is of course not a purely linguistic disagreement. To explain why, let us
examine again what is actually done in MC’s second try.
A. Consider the first step of the second try (t2a).
This step is described under the label ‘translation according to the
preservation of IR’. But as pointed out before, in the second try, we are
not looking, in T1 and in T2, for terms presenting similar IR. Indeed in
(t2a), we in fact continue to focus on the same linguistic items L1 and
L2 that were involved in the first try
12, that is, on items that are, from
the beginning, assumed to have different and incompatible IR (since
this is indeed the conclusion of the first try that the linguistic items
under scrutiny have different and incompatible IR). Thus in (t2a) we
associate to L2 the IR usually associated with L1 in T1: we import in
T2 a linguistic network usually pertaining to T1 (or conversely).
I do not think that this operation is well-labelled as a ‘translation
according to preservation of IR’.
Of course, we can identify some reasons why this operation has been
associated with the expression ‘preservation of IR’: indeed, the opera-
tion consists in focusing on the IR of L1, in ‘preserving’ these IR, and
then, in grafting them, untouched, on L2 of T2. But it is nevertheless
problematic to interpret this operation as a translation preserving the
IR. It seems to me that a translation, even metaphorically understood,
should at least entail the idea of the search for an equivalence (of a
kind to be defined) between some elements of the two languages (or the
two realms whatever they are) under comparison. This being admitted,
a successful translation (here according to IR) should mean, if not an
identity, at least a sufficiently strong similarity between two linguistic
items pertaining to T1 and T2 respectively (here between the IR of these
items).
As this condition is not satisfied in the case of the linguistic items
L1 and L2 involved in MC’s second try (as MC recognizes himself in the
conclusion of his first try), I conclude that it is better to reserve the label
12Or almost the same: for ex. in the first try MC considers “phlogiston escape”
and “oxygen bounding”, and in the second one, “phlogiston” and “oxygen”.
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‘translation according to preservation of IR’ to the operation involved
in t1b (that is, to TIR1 = TIR: to look for, and to find if the translation
is successful, two linguistic networks of T1 and T2 that possess similar
structures, that are superimposable).
As for the operation involved in t2a, I will characterize it as a graft
(G) of foreign IR: a graft, on a given linguistic item L1 used in a well
defined theoretical context T1, of a foreign network of IR (foreign in the
sense that the linguistic item L2 associated to this network is customarily
used in a theoretical context T2 different from T1, historically separated
from T1).
Note that to talk about a graft does not presuppose anything about
the acceptance/rejection of the graft. In MC’s second try, the rejection of
the graft is inevitable, because from the beginning, by construction, the
graft deals with incompatible inferential networks. But we can perfectly
imagine cases in which successful grafts take place. This happens if
the foreign T1 and T2 under scrutiny are, although at first foreign in
the sense of empirically separated, nevertheless compatible, additionable
(not incommensurable).
Whatever label one is ready to use, I think that the operations in-
volved in step (t1b) on the one hand (in my notations: TIR1 = TIR),
and on the other hand in (t2a) (in my notations: TIR2 = G) should
be carefully distinguished. Both could be taken into account in a fined-
grained characterization of incommensurability.
B. Consider now the second step of the second try (t2b).
Here one provides, for the relation between the two incompatible
structures associated to L1 and L2 already involved in the first try, a
different description from the one proposed in the first try. This dif-
ferent description consists in emphasizing that, according to T2, L1 is
empty. And such a description is categorized as a ‘failure to apply’, a
failure of the clause ‘translation preserving the CA’.
Two remarks can be made about (t2b).
First, to emphasize that from T2’s point of view, L1 describes a state
of affairs that does not correspond to anything in the physical world,
simply amounts to clarify a necessary consequence of the premise of the
second try: namely, that the IR of L1 and the IR of L2 are incompatible.
Indeed, as it is admitted from the beginning in the second try, at least
tacitly, that the two chosen candidates to TIR2 have inconsistent IR,
they cannot both refer to existing physical states of affairs (or both be
adequate descriptions of the physical world); at least one of them must
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be empty (or inadequate). In brief, in (t2b), what is actually done, is to
continue to focus on the same inconsistent theoretical structures involved
in the first try, and then, just to develop a little bit more the clause ‘to
have incompatible IR’.
Second, the question arises to decide if the judgments of the T2’s
adherents (resp. T1’s adherents) about the emptiness of L1 (resp. L2)
are well-labelled as judgments concerning CA (in my vocabulary: CA2).
At first sight, the present terminological point seems less problematic
than the previous one concerning ‘translation according to the preserva-
tion of IR’. Indeed, neither of senses MC has given to the expression
‘CA’ stands in opposition with customary contemporary usages. In par-
ticular the second sense — the choice to name ‘CA’ what is analysed in
t2b, which is what we want now to discuss –, corresponds to one of the
ordinary usages of the expression ‘CA’. True, we commonly say that
a term ‘does not apply (at all)’ to mean that this term does not name
anything existing in the physical world (licorns, for ex.).
Now, if we reflect a little bit more on the nature of judgments of the
CA2-type, we can feel uncomfortable with the label ‘CA’. Judgments
of the CA2-type are, in fact, modal judgments characterizing the status
of already available statements holding in a theoretical context T . They
are second order judgments about the adequacy and objectivity of some
assumptions of T (if not about the independent existence of some states
of affairs targeted by T ). They are second order judgments in a chrono-
logical as well as in a logical sense: although we can be agnostic about
the fact that a word L applies2 when we have specified its theoretical
content and the way it is connected to some empirical situations, we
must necessarily have the latter specification at our disposal in order to
be able to decide if L applies2. Yet, to admit the preceding characteriza-
tion is to admit that judgments of the CA2-type can be (and indeed are
most of the time in MC’s examples) modal judgments about previously
isolated IR. This may render confused the distinction between CA and
IR.
This being said and kept in mind, I will nevertheless conclude, taking
into account customary usages, that the problem, with MC’s notion of
CA, is not so much in itself to have labelled ‘CA’ (tout court) what I
have isolated as CA2, but to have conflated, under one and the same
expression, two operations (my CA1 and CA2) which are not identical
and which should be distinguished in the context of the incommensura-
bility problem. In what follows I will, for my part, maintain the generic
common expression ‘CA’, in order to indicate that there are substantial
common points and relations between both determinants, but I will con-
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tinue to distinguish with suffix 1 and 2 the two operations involved in
the first and the second try, in order to stress the substantial differences
spelled out above.
Let us recapitulate what is done in the first and second try:
t1a = to look for some linguistic items that have the same CA1; suc-
cessful attempt; conclusion: L1 and L2 are translatable according
to the CA1.
t1b = to try to translate according to ‘sameness of IR’ (=TIR); un-
successful attempt; conclusion: L1 and L2 are have different IR
and are not translatable according to ‘sameness of IR’.
t2a = to graft the IR of L1 on L2 and reciprocally (= G, inadequately
described as a TIR by MC);
t2b = to examine the CA2 of L1 and L2; conclusion: if L1 have CA2,
then L2 does not apply2, and if L2 have CA2, then L1 does not
apply2; thus L1 and L2 do not have the same CA2.
More will be said about the substantial common points and differ-
ences between CA1 and CA2 (see section 6). But first, we need to reflect
again on the notion of CA1.
5. An analysis of the notion of CA1
5.1. Several characterizations of the notion of CA in MC’s
analysis of incommensurability
Several characterizations of the notion of CA1 are used throughout MC’s
various papers on incommensurability.
At the beginning and at a general level, the CA of a term (my CA1)
are said to be “determined by the set of situations to which the concept
is thought to apply (or not to apply, respectively)” [77].
Subsequently MC uses several different expressions in order to explain
the clause ‘same CA’, for instance:
• to be “applied [non accidentally] to the same objects” [76]; to “refer
to the same state of affairs” [76];
• to be “applied under the same observable circumstances” ([Carrier
2002, 137], and without the adjective “observable” [85]);
120 Léna Soler
• to be “determined empirically in the same way” ([81], [Carrier 2002,
134];
• to have the “same empirical import” [Carrier 2002, 134];
• to satisfy the condition “equality of measuring procedures”13 [81],
[Carrier 2002, 134] (emphasis added);
• to satisfy the condition “equality of measuring indications” [Carrier
2002, 134] (emphasis added);
• to satisfy the condition same “values obtained” [Carrier 2002, 137].
(Most of these expressions also appear in [Carrier 2001]).
Are these expressions all equivalent? It is doubtful that the answer
could be positive. Particulary with respect to concepts linked to mea-
surement practices, one may find natural to ask: is the use of the same
instrument sufficient to conclude that the concepts have the same CA?
Or do the results of the measurements have moreover to be the same?
More generally, what has exactly to be identical, in order to be able
to conclude that two words have the same CA? These are not trivial
questions and, as we shall see, we will encounter similar problems in the
following analysis.
Shifting to the analysis of particular examples, we find the same
diversity of meaning concerning the notion of CA (CA1). Let us list
most of them.
• The term “length” is said to have the same CA (CA1) in the
lorentzian and einsteinian frameworks, because “measurements based
on rod transport or transmission time of light signals are equally
accepted within both theories. That is, classical electrodynamics
(ED) and special relativity (SR) roughly agree on the acceptabil-
ity of length measurements. Measuring lengths by registering the
round-trip travel time of a light signal, as it is done, for instance,
in a Michelson-Morley setup is endorsed within the two accounts,
and the results of the procedure are unanimously acknowledged as
reliable” [81].
13The expression is introduced putting the stress on the fact that the two incom-
mensurable traditions agree on the “reliability” of some determined instrument-types
and experimental procedures, and thus on the “trustworthiness” of the results ob-
tained by the corresponding procedures.
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• The CA (CA1) of the lorentzian and einsteinian term “mass” are
similar, since “mass is evaluated in the same way in the two ac-
counts in question. They both endorse determining mass values
using a balance or collision processes (thereby drawing on momen-
tum conservation)” [84].
• The CA (CA1) of “phlogiston escape” and “oxygen bounding”
“roughly coincide”, since “in most cases in which partisans of the
phlogiston theory thought it legitimate to apply the predicate “phlo-
giston escape”, adherents of the oxygen theory would speak of “oxy-
gen bounding” [Carrier 2001, 75].
• “Impetus” and “momentum” are said to have the same CA (CA1)
because “both quantities are estimated by the product of a body’s
velocity and its weight or mass” [Carrier 2001, 77].
• In order to spell out the CA (CA1) of the concept of “geocentric
planet”, MC lists the relevant celestial objects falling under the
concept (Moon, Mercury, etc.) [Carrier 2001, 77].
Without pretending to give an exhaustive analysis of the clause ‘CA
of a linguistic item’, I want to distinguish several CA1-types involved in
MC’s papers, and to stress some difficulties about the CA1 determinant.
5.2. Distinguishing several CA1-types: CA1obj and CA1mes
To begin with, let us describe the internal structure (or if one prefers,
the ‘grammar’ in a wittgensteinian spirit) of any CA1, and let us fix
some notations that will be used all along the paper. Any CA1 may be
decomposed in three components:
• The subject of the application (say Sa), which is a linguistic item
(a single linguistic item L or a composed one like a sentence or a
theory T );
• The point of application (say Pa) or the object of the application,
that is, (the description of14) the set of empirical situations (say
Eis) to which Sa applies;
14I add ‘the description of’ since I consider the situation from the point of view of
the philosopher of science, who have to render things explicit.
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• The relation (say Ra) constitutive of the application, that is, (the
specification of) the kind of link which is supposed to hold between
Sa and the Eis equated to the Pa. Although the ‘application’
lexicon is, as we will see, plastic and vague, not every relation can
aspire to be a relation of application.
The ultimate motivation for introducing the notion of CA and for
distinguishing it from the notion of IR — and, as we said, what makes
the interest of the notion of CA — is, basically, the need to name and
take into account the non linguistic dimension of science (embodied in
our Eis above): the fact that science has the peculiarity to grow in
a very intimate relation with extra-linguistic concrete experiences. In
agreement with such a motivation, all the MC’s characterizations or in-
stances of ‘CA1’ given above have in common, beyond their differences,
to target what (in a given state of knowledge) is taken as real empirical
situations: either existing phenomena like observable combustions, ob-
servable celestial bodies, observable changes in the place and the velocity
of macroscopic bodies, etc.; or real available experiments involving real
scientists performing real manipulations on real instrumental objects,
like mass measurements with the help of a balance, or length measure-
ments by means of the Michelson-Morley device, etc.
Now, despite the fact that all of MC’s characterizations or instances
of ‘CA1’ share the feature to vindicate the rights of the extra-linguistic
reality through the targeted Eis, they also manifest striking differences
concerning the kinds of Eis involved.
• First, the Eis involved are sometimes ‘natural’ and sometimes ar-
tificially (experimentally) produced, and they correspond, some-
times to naked-eye (or naked-sense) observations, sometimes to
highly instrumented observations.
• Second, these Eis may be divided into two different types: what
I will call the objective Eis (or Eiobj), and what I will call the
auxiliary or measuring Eis (or Eimes).
– The objective Eis are empirical situations taken to be mani-
festations of the object under study (of the physical reality for
ex.), and correlatively, taken to provide phenomena that have
to be explained by (that are relevant for) theories responsible
of this order of reality (physical theories for ex.).
– By contrast, the measuring Eis are empirical situations (in
modern physics most of the time highly instrumented em-
pirical situations) performed in order to determine (most of
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the time to measure if we deal with modern physics) some
variables defined by one or the other of the available theories
about the object under investigation15.
• In other words we have:
– On the one side, situations in which the linguistic item L
is supposed to play a significant role (situations exhibited in
order to show that the reality named L — whatever it is from
an ontological and mathematical point of view — is indeed
involved here, and thus that the linguistic item L is one of
the relevant element in order to characterize the objective
situation under scrutiny).
– On the other side, situations conceived and performed in order
to detect the presence of L, or to determine the amount or
the value or the variation of L.
• In MC’s examples the specification of the CA1 of a linguistic item
involves sometimes reference to some objective Eis (ex. Ei = com-
bustions; L = ‘phlogiston’ or ‘oxygen’), and sometimes reference
to some measuring Eis (ex. Ei = experiments with a balance; L
= ‘mass’).
Thus, on the whole, to specify the CA1 of a linguistic item L in a theo-
retical context T may mean:
• Either to isolate objective empirical situations (whether naked-
eye natural observations, naked-eye produced observations, or in-
strumentally produced observations) for which the L-variable is
thought, according to the adherents of T , to be relevant, if not ab-
solutely required, in order to achieve a sound characterization (and
situations for which, correlatively, the reality named L is thought
— by the same scientists — to be indeed actually present).
I will label such cases ‘CA1obj’.
In such cases the relation Ra underlying the verb ‘to apply1’ corre-
sponds to the relation: ‘to be relevant’ (in order to achieve a sound
characterization of the objective situation under study).
15The distinction corresponds more or less to the one introduced, in the present
volume, by Emiliano Trizio when explaining his notion of dual taxonomies (that
is, taxonomies composed by a part about experimental instrumented practices and
another part about the objective reality under study). Reading his paper while
writing my own has helped me to recognize the need to use a distinction of this kind
in order to analyse MC’s notion of CA.
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• Or to isolate (most of the time instrumented) experimental proce-
dures conceived as relevant reliable means to determine (most of
the time to measure) L.
I will label such case ‘CA1mes’.
Here the relation Ra underlying the CA1 corresponds to the re-
lations: ‘to be relevant and reliable’ (in order to determine the
magnitudes involved in some theory).
5.3. The dependance of the CA1 upon IR, CA1 in the en-
larged/restricted sense
Remarks:
A. Although there are most of the time links between CA1obj and CA1mes ,
it is not necessary that they coincide. We can imagine that (and find his-
torical examples in which) two scientific traditions roughly agree about
the relevance of the same empirical situations (about the fact that their
theories have to explain such situations), but do not agree about (all) the
experimental instrumented means that are reliable in order to determine
the central variables involved in the available theories.
This is a reason why it is better to distinguish carefully CA1obj and
CA1mes , as two possible ways to understand the notion of CA1.
The term ‘CA1obj ’ refers to the set of the situations (possibly highly
instrumented) to be explained (the relevant situations). It is the most
intuitive and common way to understand the idea of ‘CA’ of a theory
T or a particular linguistic item L. The term ‘CA1mes ’ refers to the
experimental means supposed to be reliable with respect to the task of
determining the magnibutes mentioned by available theories.
Shifting from the specification of CA1 to the clause ‘to have the same
CA1’ we have the following equivalences:
• Same CA1obj = same set of relevant empirical situations Eis.
The adherents of two incommensurable theories agree about the
objective empirical situations to be explained — or about most of
them, most of the ones known by both rival traditions.
• Same CA1mes = same set of relevant reliable means for determining
the scientific magnitudes involved.
The adherents of two incommensurable theories agree about the
reliability of the experimental procedures adopted to measure the-
oretical variables — or about the reliability of most of them, of
most of the ones known by both rival traditions.
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B. The descriptions of the empirical situations involved at both levels are
of course, even in the case of naked-eye natural observations, all theory
laden: all of them rely on a (in principle potentially evolutive) taxon-
omy, be it a taxonomy covering naked-eye observations, or a taxonomy
including instrument-types and experiment-types. This means that:
(a) The descriptions of what the historian of science sometimes identi-
fies trans-paradigmatically as one and the same empirical situation,
may be, in actual episodes of the history of science, coordinated
to ‘observational’ descriptions that change from a scientific tradi-
tion to an other incommensurable one. In that case the historian
of science will be able to detect, by contrast, ‘tacit theoretical as-
sumptions’ and ‘questionable inferences’ in the old scientists way
of talking, where these old scientists themselves only saw ‘given
observational descriptions’.
(b) Some (more or less hidden) IR are thus involved in the specifica-
tion of CA1 (the one underlying the descriptions of the empirical
situations involved), so that the specification of CA1 cannot avoid
the specification of some IR. In other words, the CA1 determinant
is not completely independent of the IR determinant.
(c) In consequence, we have to distinguish between two kinds of IR:
the ones to be associated with the theoretical integration of a con-
cept, and the ones to be associated with its empirical application.
Yet this is indeed a problem, because the theoretical and empirical
levels are of course not separated in re by a natural and sharp
dividing line. We do not have, on the one side the description of
the relevant empirical situations (with their underlying ‘observa-
tional’ or ‘very empirical’ IR), and on the other side the theoretical
descriptions (with their underlying ‘theoretical’ IR).
We will come back to points (b) and (c) section 6.
C. The situation is moreover complicated by the circumstance that the
verb ‘to apply’ is currently employed in order to label epistemological
configurations for which nobody assumes that the point of application
Pa is ‘observational’ or even that it is a ‘faithful description of a real
state of affairs’. We commonly say that a theoretical item L applies to
this or that situation, where the situation involved is not, in any sense, an
‘immediately observational’ one, but is a highly theoretical and idealized
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model supposed to cover an open class of empirical situations that may
be perceptively very different16 from one another.
D. And that is still not all. Suppose that difficulties B(c) and C are
set aside, that is, suppose that Pa is unproblematically ‘observational’
or ‘very empirical’, and that we are indeed allowed, for some practical
purpose, to draw a well determined dividing line between, on the one
hand, the level of what can be taken as given (naked-eye or instrumented)
observations Eis and, on the other hand, the level of what can be taken
as theoretical interpretation of these Eis.
This being admitted and according to our definition of CA1, to spec-
ify the CA1 of L in the context of T should amount in principle:
(i) To describe a set of (by hypothesis unproblematically observa-
tional) empirical situations Eis (let us label the network of IR
constituting such descriptions IREi);
(ii) To select these Eis on the grounds that they are — among the
larger set of the Eis that appear to be relevant with respect to the
theory T to which L pertains — the Eis to which L applies. (If we
deal with CA1obj , it means that the linguistic item L is relevant
and required in order to achieve a sound scientific characterization;
and if we deal with CA1mes , it means that the Eis mentioned are
relevant reliable means in order to measure L).
In principle (i) and (ii) should be enough17, but in reality, this is
rarely the case18. Why? Because it seems that more can (if not must)
be said about the link Ra between L and the Eis.
Saying that L is relevant for spelling out the Eis amounts apparently
to stating nothing more than the fact that L indeed applies to the Eis.
16Kuhn’s texts offer many examples. Cf. for instance, in [Kuhn 1962], Kuhn’s
analysis of the way the sketch-law F = ma ‘applies to nature’. Here, as in many
other illustrations of the function of exemplars in science, ‘nature’ does not equate
with ‘direct observations’ or even with ‘low-level theoretical statements’. ‘Nature’
means ‘highly theoretical idealized models of nature’, although less theoretical (i.e.,
here, less general) that the covering law F = ma. For further developments on this
point, see Emiliano Trizio’s paper in the present volume.
17And sometimes things work in this way in MC’s presentation: for ex., when he
claims that “phlogiston escape” and “oxygen bonding” have the same CA (CA1).
Here the claim can be taken as implying that the phlogisticians and the lavoisians
assume that roughly the same set of empirical situations are relevant (combustions,
etc.), and that, in the presence of the same relevant phenomena, they will describe
them, respectively as a phlogiston escape, or an oxygen bounding.
18Cf. the examples just below.
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But couldn’t L apply to the same Eis in many different ways? This is
indeed a current way of talking. Think for example of the so-called em-
pirically equivalent theories: they exactly embody such a configuration.
This fact leads us to tell more about Ra: not only to state that L ap-
plies to the Eis, but moreover to clarify how L is linked to them, to spell
out in what precisely consists, in each case, the relation of application
involved.
Yet in order to do that, one has to introduce new demarcations within
the total network of assumptions characterizing a given scientific tradi-
tion. Suppose that one has taken the linguistic item L as the subject of
the application Sa. L is not directly linked to the Eis, and L is not only
linked to these Eis but also to many theoretical items. Thus in order
to specify the CA1 of L one will have, given the Eis, to cut the whole
inferential network surrounding L in two different parts: a theoretical
‘essential’ (or ‘defining’) fragment IRDL ; and a less theoretical fragment
playing the role of bridge between the IRDL and the Eis (IRB[L−Ei]).
In that case, the specification of the CA1 of L in the context T will
require, besides the tasks (i) and (ii) mentioned above, the additional
following task:
(iii) To spell out the way L is related to the Eis (and in so doing, to
rely on a network of relations IRB); or in other words, to spell out
through what precise connexions the Eis are relevant with respect
to the application of L, to spell out how L applies to these Eis.
Let us label a specification of the CA1 integrating this third compo-
nent ‘the CA1 in the enlarged sense’ (contrasted with the CA1 in
the restricted sense).
To specify the CA1 of L in such enlarged sense implies, obviously, to
enlarge the IR constitutive of CA1. Indeed, if we rely on the enlarged
sense of the CA1, to accept the clause ‘L1 and L2 have the same CA1’
amounts to accept not only that the same Eis are relevant with respect
to L1 and L2, but moreover that L1 and L2 are related to these Eis in
the same way.
5.4. Applying the elaborated distinctions to MC’s analysis of
examples
The preceding remarks will be developed in section 6 below. By listing
them here, I mainly intend: first, to provide more fine-grained analytical
tools in order to analyse MC’s examples and more generally examples
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of incommensurability; second, to identify the reasons which — alto-
gether or separately depending on the particular case under issue —
work toward the undesirable effect that, in MC’s analysis of concrete
examples, the two determinants of CA (CA1) and IR — that seemed at
the beginning of his presentation, at the general and abstract level, well
defined and separated — often interfere in practice. Let us give some
illustrations.
A. Here are some examples in which MC is claiming to deal with CA
(my CA1) but in which IR surreptitiously enter into play, leading the
reader to feel, at first sight at least, that the situation should be (or
could be) characterized in terms of IR.
Ex1. When MC gives the list of the celestial objects falling under the
concept of “geocentric planet” (Moon, Mercury, etc.) as an exemplifica-
tion of what it means to specify the CA of “geocentric planet”, we are at
first sight surprised: in so doing, aren’t we typically spelling out the IR
(or theoretical integration) of the considered concept?
Now I would characterize the situation as a case of restricted CA1obj :
• Restricted, because the reasons why the Moon, Mercury etc. are
assumed to be geocentric planets are not articulated (the way the
linguistic item “geocentric planet” applies1 to the celestial bodies
named “Moon”, “Mercury” etc. is not made explicit);
• Objective, because the (descriptions of the) Eis here involved, that
is, the (descriptions of the) considered celestial bodies as they ap-
pear from the earth, may be viewed as (descriptions of) objec-
tive given phenomena that astronomical theories have to explain,
(rather than producedEis identified with reliable means performed
in order to show that the Moon, Mercury etc. indeed are geocentric
planets).
Ex.2. MC claims that the CA (CA1) of “mass” in ED and SR are
the same, because “mass is evaluated in the same way in the two ac-
counts in question. They both endorse determining mass values using
a balance or collision processes (thereby drawing on momentum conser-
vation)” (84, emphasis added). Reading this passage we can see (since
this is here explicitly pointed out by MC) that the empirical evaluations
under consideration are not independent of something, namely the mo-
mentum conservation, which is a highly theoretical principle holistically
linked — according to the adopted contextual theory of meaning — to
many other theoretical pieces, and which is then on the side of the IR
(theoretical integration).
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Now, I would characterize the situation as a case of enlarged CA1mes :
• Enlarged, because, with the allusion to the principle of momentum
conservation, there is a (admittedly quite embryonic) specification
of the way the linguistic item “mass” applies1 to empirical situa-
tions involving balances or collision processes;
• Measuring, because the (description of the) Eis under scrutiny are,
here, (descriptions of) basic instruments and basic manipulations
corresponding to procedures intended to measure the magnitude
named “mass”.
Ex3. When “impetus” and “momentum” are said to have the same CA
(CA1) because “both quantities are estimated by the product of a body’s
velocity and its weight or mass”, this sounds again at first sight strange:
in specifying the relation between velocity and mass underlying the two
incommensurable concepts, aren’t we typically deploying their theoreti-
cal IR?
In this example it is not easy to qualify the situations in terms of our
distinctions, because it is not very clear if MC’s verb “estimated” intends
to refer to measures of impetus and momentum via measurements of
velocity and mass, or if it intends to refer to a theoretical explanation
of the links assumed by both theories between the concepts involved.
At least our distinctions allow us to identify promptly what we need to
clarify in order to be able to specify the situation.
By the way, the example illustrates how complex the situation is.
Indeed, suppose that the first of the two possibilities listed holds19. Ad-
mitting MC’s characterization, two different experimental measurements
are required in order to determine each quantity (impetus and momen-
tum), so that the linguistic item “momentum” (for ex.) applies1mes to
two different Eimes — these Eimes corresponding to (the description
of) the two basic experimental procedures. Now, these Eimes need to
be related one to the other in a certain way if the momentum is to be
determined. Yet, how are we going to characterise such a relation? If we
want to equate the corresponding IR with a component of the specifica-
tion of the CA1 of “momentum”, we can consider it as specifying the way
“momentum” applies1 to the two Eis taken together. But this is a more
complex case than the configuration considered above in (iii), in which
the condition ‘the way a linguistic item L applies1’ named the relation
19This is probably what MC has in mind; if the second possibility held, I think we
should better describe the situation in terms of ‘pure IR’ instead of CA.
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between L and one single class of empirical situation Ei.
B. Here is, now, an example in which, reciprocally, MC claims to deal
with IR, whereas we are at first sight inclined to qualify what is at issue
as CA1.
Just after saying that “phlogiston escape” and “oxygen bounding”
have (roughly) the same CA (CA1), MC continues: “the drawback is
that the inferential relations fail to be preserved. A case in point is
that the presence of phlogiston is connected with the colour and the
nature [oily-fatty nature for ex.] of the pertinent substance” [Carrier
2001, 76]. He goes on explaining that the adherents of the phlogiston
theory see a substantial connexion between the presence of phlogiston on
the one hand, and the colour and oily-fatty aspects of the bodies on the
other, whereas such relation is no longer accepted by the adherents of the
oxygen theory; he adds that phenomena like colour or oily-fatty aspect
are no longer, for many lavoisians, relevant phenomena with respect to
the task of a chemical theory.
Yet, why does MC describe such a situation in terms of ‘different IR’?
Aren’t we here typically in the presence of a case of ‘different CA1’? That
is, a case in which each rival incommensurable theory assumes different
sets of phenomena as relevant (here, very basic naked-eye observable
phenomena like the colour or the fatty aspect of bodies)? Or else, if
we consider those scientists that assume colour and oily-fatty nature to
be relevant, aren’t we typically in the presence of a case in which the
linguistic items under scrutiny differently apply1 to the same empirical
situations?20. In brief, aren’t we typically in the presence of a case in
which key concepts of each rival theory either apply to different sets of
situations, or differently apply to the same restricted situations21?
Personally I am inclined to subsume the present example under the
category of CA1obj , and to describe it as a case of difference of CA1
(i.e. the two linguistic items under scrutiny, ‘phlogiston’ and ‘oxygen’,
do not have the same CA1 for the empirical situations examined — ei-
ther because they do not apply to the same Eis, or because they apply
20The way ‘phlogiston’ applies1 — is linked by the phlogistician – to these Eis (for
ex.: fatty-nature means a high quantity of a principle, phlogiston) is not the way in
which ‘oxygen’ applies1 to the same Eis (lavoisians do not explain what this link is).
21In the judgments concerning CA1, we can focus on a single restricted class of
empirical situations, or enlarge the object of focus, up to a — of course idealized
— clause corresponding to ‘all the phenomena that the theory has to explain’ or
‘all relevant phenomena’. This can of course modify the decisions about CA1 (the
conclusion that we have the same or different CA1). The point will be examined in
section 8 below.
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differently to the same Eis). The reason for this choice is that unprob-
lematically very ‘observational’ ‘given’ observations are involved here
(the colour of the bodies, their fatty aspect. . . ). Yet, as we will see in a
more detailed way in section 7 below, such unproblematically intuitive
observational character is one of the only way we have, in practice, to
differentiate the CA1 from the ‘pure’ IR. If cases involving items that
are so observational are not counted as CA, what will be?
At least, we can experience, through the consideration of these exam-
ples, how the application of the distinction between the two determinants
CA and IR can be problematic in practice. I will come back later to
this problem and try, in section 7, to identify at a more general level the
fundamental reasons for such interferences between CA1 and IR. For
the moment, let us keep in mind the central conclusion: we cannot avoid
to rely on some IR in order to specify the CA1 of any scientific linguistic
item.
6. Exploring the substantial relations between CA1
and CA2
Let us now come back, as promised at the end of section 4, to the sub-
stantial common points and relations between CA1 and CA2, the ones
that may justify the appeal to a common generic expression in order to
label the two operations involved.
As already noticed in section 4, in current usages we employ one and
the same verb ‘to apply’ to mean CA2 in some occurrences, and to mean
CA1 in some others. Yet, this fact is not at all gratuitous. Indeed, CA1
and CA2 are two distinct but related senses, and it is not useless, for the
analysis of our present problem, to clarify the nature of these relations.
The fundamental common point between CA1 and CA2 is obvious:
both concern the relation between the linguistic and the non linguistic,
the connection between the words and the world.
The differences come from the sort of relation involved. This last
point has been already sketched in section 4, but it can now be restated
relying on the analysis of CA1 provided in section 5.
A. ‘The relation of L to the physical world’, understood in the
CA1-sense, names:
• either (if we consider the restricted CA1) simply a no further spec-
ified relation of relevance (for CA1obj ) or of reliability (for CA2
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• or (if we consider the enlarged CA1) some specified connexions
(my IRB) that a given scientific theory T assumes between L and
some observational situations Eis taken as given.
At this level, two remarks can be done.
First, a physical (or more generally scientific) concept will always
have CA in this sense. Indeed, a physical concept cannot completely fail
to apply1
22; otherwise it would reduce to a purely metaphysical concept
(in the logical positivist sense).
Second, to recognize that an expression applies1, and eventually to
spell out moreover some of the precise relations IRB that are responsible
for this application in a given framework T , is in principle completely
independent of any ontological presupposition or commitment about the
real/fictitious character of the theoretical states of affairs involved. Once
the links between L and some empirical situations according to T have
been stated (for ex. once explained that — or in what way — the
words ‘phlogiston’ or ‘oxygen’ are related — apply1 — to experiences of
combustion in their original framework), we still have to decide if these
relations are sufficiently adequate, objective or true of the world.
It is at this point that CA2 eventually come into play, as higher-
level judgments about lower level relations (the later lower-level relation
being possibly relations involved in the specification of CA1 — in my
notations, IRB).
B. The relation of L to the physical world’, understood in the in
the CA2-sense, names, as we explained section 4, a modal judgment (a
judgment of sufficient empirical adequacy or of independent existence)
about some previously specified first level assumptions.
Now, the object of such modal judgment, that is, the previously
specified first level assumptions can, in principle, be identified with any
selected part of the T -framework:
• with some IRB;
• or with some IRDL .
Hence, as a particular case, the object of such modal judgment can be
something previously characterized under the category of ‘CA1’. In such
cases, previously specified CA1 are a required condition of the possibility
22Even if the connections of this concept to empirical situations are complex and
indirect. I will come back to this point below.
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of CA2-judgments, and there is a generative link between judgments of
CA1 and judgments of CA2. This is especially striking if we understand
CA1 in the enlarged sense, that is, if we include in CA1 of L some spec-
ification of the way L is linked to the relevant empirical situations Eis.
In that case, determined CA2-judgments depend on the number and on
the success of the (often predictive) bridge statements that constitute
the CA1’s network and that link L to observational/experimental situa-
tions. CA2-judgments (= ‘the linguistic item L, understood according to
theoretical context T , applies2, or fails to apply2’) are therefore largely
rooted in (if not univocally determined on the basis of) an evaluation of
the way L applies1 (or fails to apply1).
For our purpose, the point is better considered in a comparative per-
spective: the verdicts ‘L2 of T2 applies2 / L1 of T1 fails to apply2’ are
largely grounded in a comparative analysis of the way L1 and L2 respec-
tively apply1 (or fail to apply1) within their original (different, eventually
incommensurable) frameworks T1 and T2. True, on the whole, the bal-
ance is not always easy to make, and in real historical situations, it is not
necessarily consensual. The more the theoretical change is revolutionary,
the more incommensurability will increase, and the more the judgments
about the empirical global superiority of one theory on the other will
become increasingly delicate, and possibly, in actual revolutionary peri-
ods, not homogeneous in the community of specialists23. Nevertheless,
from the overhanging perspective of the historian of science, there is no
doubt that einsteinian relativity is empirically superior to Newtonian
physics, or that the oxygen theory is, by far, more empirically adequate
than the phlogiston theory. This is true in the minimal sense that the
post-revolutionary theory is largely more apt, on the whole, to account
for (that is: to apply1 to) known empirical situations (and this, despite
of some possible marginal cases of kuhnian losses).
Admittedly, in actual historical controversies, other factors than quan-
titative considerations concerning the set of empirical situation explained
come into play in theory comparison (such as estimations of simplicity,
or conformity to other aesthetical or thematic requirements. . . ). But
considering the net result of the historical process, we can claim that
the recent theory T2 is indeed supported by a larger number of empirical
situations than T1, and that T2 is able to predict more exactly some em-
pirical situations also predicted by T1: in other words, T2 applies1 better
than its rival T1. Yet from this fact, one commonly tends to conclude
that T2 is a better description of reality than T1, which is equivalent
23Cf. [Soler 2004a].
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to say, in our technical vocabulary, that T2 applies2 whereas T1 fails to
apply2 — or more cautiously: that if one of the two theories T1 and T2
refers to real states of affairs (= applies2), it has to be T2 and not T1.
In brief, the judgments about the success/failure of the associations
assumed, inside of each rival framework T1 and T2, between L and some
observable experimental results (i.e. the judgments about the quality of
CA1), indeed influence deeply the modal comparative judgments about
the comparative adequacy of each theory (i.e. the judgments about the
ability/failure to apply2). In most cases
24, at least from the point of
view of the historian, it is because L2 is thought to apply1 better than
it’s correlate L1 of T1, that L2 is assumed to apply2 whereas its correlate
L1 of T1 is assumed to fail to apply2.
On the basis of these considerations, developed with the intention to
clarify the relations between CA1 and CA2, I want to reaffirm a previous
conclusion and make a remark.
At the end of section 4, I concluded that, although CA1 and CA2
correspond to different operations that have to be distinguished in the
context of the incommensurability problem, it is legitimate to use one
and the same generic expression to label both operations. I maintain
that conclusion and hope that the arguments in its favour are now clear.
The remark is the following. As noticed above, first we need, in order
to perform modal judgments corresponding to CA2, to specify and to
take for given some aspects of the theories T1 and T2 under scrutiny,
and second, modal judgments of the application2-type can in principle
be directed toward any part of the T -framework. In particular, the
later judgments can be directed either toward highly large networks of
assumptions held by the adherents of T , or toward very circumscribed
propositions (for ex. toward the following one — say (p) –, ascribed
to a phlogiston world-view’s adherent: ‘one and the same substance is
exchanged in all reactions of combustion’).
Yet, it is important to stress the interdependence between, on the one
hand, the choice to focus on this or that (more or less extended, more
or less observational) network of relations surrounding a given term L
in a given context, and on the other hand, the judgments in favour or
24In most cases only, for two reasons: first this holds on the whole, concerning
several important concepts of the theories under comparison, but it could fail to hold
for some particular marginal concepts; and second, we can imagine some peculiar
situations, for example periods during which a new theory is proposed, in which
some practitioners of physics believe that this theory is the good one (i.e. that this
theory is the most accurate as to its fundamental ontological assumptions), even if it
has not yet proved its empirical superiority with respect to the existing alternatives.
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against the conclusion that a term applies2.
In MC’s second try, the modal judgments involved in the examples
are most of the time directed toward broad networks of theoretical rela-
tions — eventually including our statement (p) but in association with
many other theoretical claims about phlogiston that the oxygen-theory
T2 rejects. On the basis of this choice, MC is led to conclude, at the end
of his second try, that the linguistic item ‘phlogiston’ under scrutiny fails
to apply2. Now, if one had chosen to focus on more restricted parts of
the phlogiston theory involving the same linguistic item ‘phlogiston’ (for
ex., if one has focussed on our (p) in isolation), the conclusion relative
to the possibility for the term to apply2 would have been the opposite,
since (p) is maintained by T2.
This remark, and many other previous ones concerning the necessity
to cut within the whole network of assumptions constituting a scientific
paradigm, points to a cluster of important difficulties that we will discuss
in the next section.
7. Some intrinsic difficulties of the holistic-contextual
framework
Many of these difficulties do not concern specifically MC’s approach and
arise inevitably in any approach committed to the holistic-contextual
framework. They represent therefore difficulties that are essentially con-
stitutive of the incommensurability problem for anyone who thinks, like
so many people today, including me, that the holistic-contextual frame-
work is not a free methodological choice but a deep feature of human
scientific practices. However, they remain relatively hidden in MC’s
presentation, and sometimes take a particular form in MC’s model of
translation, which I will try to make explicit in the course of the reflec-
tion.
Globally considered, the difficulties referred to have, I think, two
sources.
• What I will call the global/local dilemma: the problem that al-
though we recognize that our scientific theories work holistically
(that our concepts are systems of correlated concepts, some of
them possibly equated with observational ones), we also have to
consider them in isolation and cannot use them without, up to a
point, disconnecting them from the whole linguistic structure and
from the whole set of empirical situations to which they owe their
meaning.
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• What I will call the theory/observation dilemma: the problem of
reconciling the today well-known fact that there is no sharp demar-
cation line between the observable and the theoretical levels (this
is the famous thesis of the theory-ladeness of any observation),
with the epistemological necessity to maintain the distinction, to
admit, at a pragmatical level and in a given historical context, that
certain areas of our linguistic systems can be considered as direct
descriptions of empirical basic states of affairs.
We need fundamental distinctions of these types. But at the same
time, we have to recognize that such distinctions are pragmatical and
most of the time not very sharp. This poses special difficulties when we
try to compare two deeply different frameworks.
7.1. Indeterminations at the level of judgments concerning IR
Consider, first, judgments about IR. In order to characterize incom-
mensurability precisely, we have to discuss as carefully as possible if
(and why) two given linguistic items either have sufficiently similar IR
(so as to be said translatable according to the clause ‘same IR’), or have
too different IR (so that they must be considered as untranslatable ac-
cording to the clause ‘same IR’).
In the framework of a contextual holistic theory of meaning and in
the light of the global/local dilemma, we can anticipate that many diffi-
culties will hinder such discussions, and we can understand their cause.
A holistic theory holds that the use of a term is determined by its rela-
tions to other words and to empirical situations. If holism is drastically
global, each linguistic item will have to be determined with reference
to the totality of its original framework: that is, each linguistic item L
will, in a way, contain the whole theory T , where T includes all the con-
nections to empirical situations that hold for an adherent of T . Under
such assumption, the only situation in which it would be impossible to
conclude that L1 of T1 and L2 of T2 have the same IR, would be the
case in which T1 = T2, and the criteria of IR would be deprived of any
operativity. Yet, as previously noticed, for epistemological and practi-
cal reasons, holism cannot be drastically global: we must assume local
holism. The consequence is that we have to cut the linguistic system
into parts. And the problem is to decide where the cut is to be made.
With respect to the task of comparing rival concepts L1/L2 involved
in rival theories T1/T2, we have to decide, considering the whole frame-
works 1 and 2, which part of the integral inferential network associated
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to L1 in T1, and which part of the integral inferential network associ-
ated to L2 in T2, are really important/anecdotic, essential/secondary,
considering the aim that is being pursued. We encounter here a new
version of a traditional philosophical problem, namely that of the essen-
tial/secondary properties.
Yet this kind of decision is far from being trivial, since nothing im-
poses one unique and consensually evident cut: there is, at this level, a
fundamental indeterminacy. And the more the theories are incommensu-
rable, the more the decisions of different subjects will be heterogeneous
[Soler 2004a].
In MC’s presentation this difficulty is hidden, relegated in the back-
ground: although what constitutes the ground for the judgments ‘same
IR’ or ‘different IR’ is clearly specified or identifiable, the reasons for
underlying cuts, and a fortiori the very fact that these judgments need
to rely on a non trivial cut, are not explicit. Yet the indeterminacy
becomes palpable to the reader, in cases where he would have himself
cut differently and thus would have come to different conclusions about
sameness/differences of the IR associated to two linguistic items.
The above considerations about statement (p) ‘there is one and the
same substance exchanged in all reactions of combustion’ can provide an
illustration in principle. If we operate a very circumscribed cut within
the inferential networks surrounding ‘phlogiston’ in T1 and ‘oxygen’ in
T2 — for example if we extract the particular statement (p) and focus on
it only —, we will conclude that L1 and L2 have the same IR. But if we
enlarge the inferential network associated with L1 and L2, the conclusion
will be the opposite.
The case will maybe not appear very convincing, because of the com-
mon intuition that ‘phlogiston’ cannot be essentially reduced to the (p)
characterization. But take the much discussed case of ‘mass’ in Newto-
nian and Einsteinian physics. Here the intuitions of the speakers are not
so uniform. Some are ready to grant that a sufficient core of Newtonian
assumptions about mass are conserved in Einsteinian special relativity,
so that we can conclude that ‘Newtonian mass’ indeed refers, or in our
vocabulary applies2. But others do not agree at all with this analysis
and believe that it is illegitimate to separate the shared and unshared
assumptions of Newtonian and Einsteinian scientists about mass, and
thus tend to conclude that Newtonian mass fails to apply2.
We can also appeal to the example of mass analysed in MC’s paper
(section 4). The very fact that “the dependence of total mass on real mass
and velocity is mathematically identical to the dependence of relativistic
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mass on rest mass and velocity” could be taken as a sound argument in
favour of the conclusion — which is not MC’s one — that “total mass”
and “relativistic mass” indeed (roughly) satisfy the criteria ‘sameness of
IR’. The adjective ‘roughly’ is here crucial. But since the criteria are
never exactly satisfied, we face a real problem in cases where intuitions
of the speakers do not coincide.
7.2. The ‘observational status’, as the central discriminative
pragmatical criteria in order to distinguish CA1 and IR in prac-
tice
The previous difficulty overlaps with another one, already briefly intro-
duced section 5, related to the fact that the distinction between CA
and IR is not so sharp, or more exactly, that the CA1 criterion is not
independent of the IR criterion (and hence inherits all the difficulties
pertaining to the latter). Indeed, to specify the CA of a term can not
be done without specifying some of its IR in a given framework.
Let us recall briefly why and explain the point a little bit more.
A. What does the philosopher of science have to do, when asked to
specify the CA1 of a given linguistic item L in the theoretical context
T ?
In the restricted sense of CA1, he has to specify:
(i) The relevant empirical situation(s) Eis to which the linguistic item
L is assumed to be applied according to the adherents of T ;
In the enlarged sense he has moreover to specify the way L applies
to each Ei, that is:
(ii) Some relations holding between L and each relevant empirical sit-
uation Ei according to the adherents of T .
The first element (i) points to a non linguistic, empirically given com-
ponent, and it is precisely what leads one to talk about ‘CA’ instead
of ‘pure IR’. So it is clear from the beginning that the very difference
between the two constraints upon translation, CA1 and IR, will at the
end have to be located around this point.
But this being said, a network of IR underlie both components (i)
and (ii).
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This is explicit in the very definition of (ii): to specify the CA1 in the
enlarged sense inevitably implies to spell out some inferential relations,
labelled IRB section 5. And this holds too for (i), although maybe less
obviously (cf. section 5, B). Indeed, the empirical situation E1 (resp.
E2, E3, . . . , Ei) targeted in (i) is never — at least from an overhanging
historical perspective — a single situation that could be identified here
and now by ostension. It is a constituted (in principle infinite) class
of situations assumed to be of the same kind. To identify and circum-
scribe this kind of situation, the philosopher of science has to rely on
a description of it, formulated in a specific language associated with a
specific taxonomy. Even if such a description may be labelled ‘obser-
vational’ and considered, at a given developmental stage of knowledge,
as a sort of ineluctable double of a piece of observation — so that we
can say, in an intuitive and pragmatic sense, that the specification of
CA1 have to include observational linguistic items –, it remains, just
as every description, questionable in principle (as questionable as the
‘theoretical’ assumptions that constitute it) and deconstructible. Hence,
strictly speaking, to specify the (i)-component of CA1 amounts, from
the perspective of the historian of science, to rely on a (‘observational’
or ‘empirically given’) network of IR (labelled IREi section 5).
B. But then the question arises: which inferential relations? If the CA1
includes some IR, which part of the total inferential relations of an item
L have to be counted as pertaining to its CA1, and which part have
correlatively to be counted as ‘pure IR’?
The ‘grammar’ (in a wittgensteinian sense) of the verb ‘to apply’
requires an artificial separation between at least two but more often three
different parts corresponding to two or three fragments of taxonomies
and levels of descriptions25:
For the CA1 in the restricted sense we have:
• A (relatively) higher level (or more theoretical, general level), in-
timately linked with the subject of the application L, in which an
IRDL is selected;
• A (relatively) lower level (or less theoretical, more particular level),
25In doing this we go back to a formulation of epistemological problems that is
structurally very close to the one that the logical positivists assumed, the main dif-
ference being that in the framework of the contextual-holistic theory of meaning
all distinguishing determinants (observational/theoretical, etc.) are assumed to be
pragmatically and contextually determined features, rather than absolute properties
of the states of affairs.
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intimately linked with the point of application, within which some
Eis are selected, and to which L is said to apply.
For the CA1 in the enlarged sense we have moreover:
• A (relatively) intermediate level, within which some IRB are se-
lected and by the medium of which L (that is, IRDL) is connected
to the Eis.
Now, what tells us how to cut within the total inferential network
at the heart of which L lies, so as to isolate the IR (IREi and IRB)
contributing to the CA1 of L? The demarcation line between the DL-
and the B-levels is neither sharper nor more objective than the one
between the observational and the theoretical, or between the lower level
and the two other ones.
Moreover, the situation is complicated, as already noticed section
5.3. C, by the fact that the point of application of the verb ‘to apply’ is
not, in current usages, restricted to unproblematic ‘direct observations’,
but commonly includes highly theoretical and idealized models. We saw
that the ‘grammar’ of the verb ‘to apply’ requires an artificial separation
between two or three networks of IR corresponding to three levels of
descriptions positioned on a scale of ‘theoreticity’. Yet, this does not
imply the assumption that the lower level is observational in the common
intuitive sense. And there are many current usages of the verb ‘to apply’
that presuppose the contrary (see the example note 16).
However, leaving the reference to current usages and focusing on the
task to make the CA1 and IR determinants as operant as possible in
the practice of the philosopher, I think we should try to avoid to sub-
sume under the CA1 category configurations in which the Eis involved
coincide with too theoretical idealized models. In other words, I am
inclined to consider the ‘observational’ status of the Eis as the central
discriminative pragmatical criteria when having to choose between a
characterization in terms of CA1 and a characterization in terms of IR.
Of course, there is, once more, no absolute demarcation involved
here, and we have to rely on intuition. However, one thing has to be
stressed: from the viewpoint of the historian of science comparing two
incommensurable paradigms from the vintage point of the overhanging
perspective, the ‘given-observational’ status can be legitimately ascribed
only to statements or assumptions that have indeed been (or would have
been according of the historian) unproblematically taken as ‘observa-
tional’ by the adherents of both incommensurable traditions. In this
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way we can give a sense to the clauses ‘T1 and T2 have the same Eis’,
‘T1 and T2 target a common set of relevant Eis’
26.
Let us recapitulate. We are left, when wanting to use the CA1 and
IR determinants, with the necessity to cut within the inferential net-
work involving L in order to extract the CA1 of L, together with the
difficulty that nothing imposes a sharp dividing line between what has
to be counted as pertaining to the CA1’s network of L, and what has to
be counted as pertaining to the theoretical integration network of L.
Ambiguities may arise, and in fact do arise, in the analysis of histor-
ical case studies. We sometimes hesitate to characterize the situation in
terms of CA1 or in terms of IR, to conclude that we have a case of ‘same-
ness/difference of CA1’ or a case of ‘sameness/difference of IR’, and we
are sometimes astonished by the characterizations given by others (cf.
as an illustration the discussion of MC’s examples at the end of section
5). Even when no ambiguity arises in practice — when everybody is
intuitively inclined to uphold the same conclusions about CA1 and IR
–, I think it is important to make explicit that the two characteristics
CA1 and IR are not mutually independent characteristics.
7.3. Coming back to the analytical characterization of the dif-
ferences between CA1 and IR
I tried to clarify the relations of CA1 and IR and to analyse the rea-
sons of the difficulties related to the demarcation. But now, I want to
repeat that from an epistemological point of view, the distinction be-
tween CA and IR seems to me as required as the distinction between
the observational and the theoretical –, although no less problematic. It
is therefore worth restating in what the difference between CA1 and IR
consists, in principle at the analytical level, independently of the possible
ambiguities related to the application of the distinction.
• To specify the ‘IR of L’ requires to extract, within the whole lin-
guistic network involving L in a given historical context, a single
unitary fragment encapsulating only theoretical linguistic items,
covering only inter-conceptual links detached from any connexion
to anything playing the role of ‘direct observation’.
• Whereas to specify the ‘CA1 of L’ requires moreover, in the re-
stricted sense to extract the IREi corresponding to the lowest ‘ob-
servational’ linguistic level, and in the enlarged sense, to clarify in
26See [Soler 2003].
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addition the IRB[L−Ei] corresponding to the intermediate linguistic
level.
Hence, from an analytical perspective, the difference between the two
operations ‘to specify the IR’ and ‘to specify the CA1’ lies in two facts.
• There is in the second case, but not in the first, a division of the
whole linguistic network encapsulating the whole system of beliefs
of scientists in several areas understood as hierarchical levels.
• The lowest level encapsulates descriptions targeting taken-for-given
perceptual situations, and the highest one encapsulates theoretical
descriptions targeting unobservable states of affairs whose exis-
tence is supposed to account for the known experimental results.
Thus we find in the second case, but not in the first, some ‘ob-
servational ’ linguistic items (at least as targeted, sometimes in an
indirect way), or some linguistic items having the same function
in a given context (that is, being in this context unproblematically
taken-for-granted descriptions of empirical situations).
All this encourages us to prefer, when having to name the ‘pure IR’
of a linguistic item L (by contrast with the IR involved in the CA1 of
L), the systematic use of the expression ‘theoretical integration of L’
(often employed by MC as an alternative to ‘IR’), instead of the more
generic one ‘IR’. The former label has the advantage to underline that
it is a peculiar kind of IR that is involved in the case of ‘pure IR’:
namely, a network that can be negatively characterized as exempt from
any observational linguistic item.
However, the label does not have to be understood as signifying that
the IR involved in the specification of the CA1 of L are, by contrast, not
theoretical and have nothing to do with theoretical integration. Indeed,
it is worth repeating that although the IR involved in the specification
of the CA1 of L target observations and thus inevitably comprise some
observational linguistic items, they cannot themselves be seen as ‘purely’
observational. The corresponding network will, inevitably, contain theo-
retical terms. Indeed, if L is a high-level theoretical terms of T , it will be
impossible to specify its relations to empirical situations Eis (the way
it applies1) without using, in addition of L, some other very theoretical
signifiers L′, L′′ . . . In Kuhn’s words, theories involve interrelated terms
that work holistically and apply together to nature. We encounter here
the indeed delicate but inescapable problem of evaluating the “empirical
import” [Carrier 2002, 134] of a single concept in the framework of a
contextual-holistic account of language.
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8. Some additional reflections about comparative judg-
ments involving CA1
Let us consider now comparative judgements involving CA1.
Such judgments have to estimate the similarities/differences between
the CA1 of two linguistic items L1 and L2, in order to conclude that
L1 and L2 possess the same/different CA1. Yet, it follows from the
preceding analysis that to compare the CA1 of two linguistic items L1
and L2 means to contrast each of the two elements (i) and (ii) specified
section 7:
• on the one hand the empirical situations Eis to which each of our
items apply;
• and on the other hand, the network of relations IRB[L−Ei] spelling
out the way each of them apply to its Eis (with the limiting case
where IRB = the simple claim that L1 and L2 indeed apply to
their Eis with no further specification as to the ‘how’).
This being admitted, there are, at the most general level, four possible
combinations:
L1 and L2 may be:
(a) Similarly related to the same empirical situations; (IRB1 = IRB2 =
IRB) and (Eis1 = Eis2 = Eis);
(b) Differently related to the same empirical situations; (IRB1 6= IRB2)
and (Eis1 = Eis2 = Eis);
(c) Similarly related to different empirical situations; (IRB1 = IRB2 =
IRB ) and (Eis1 6= Eis2);
(d) Differently related to different empirical situations; (IRB1 6= IRB2)
and (Eis1 6= Eis2).
In the limiting case (= for CA1 in the restricted sense), the verdicts
of the type ‘similarly/differently related to. . . ’ reduce to a disagreement
concerning the relevance of a given class of Eis with respect to a given
linguistic item L (for ex., if Ei = the fact of coloured bodies, T1 = the
phlogiston theory and T2 = the oxygen theory, we can say that T1 and
T2 are differently linked, in this minimal sense, to the same empirical
situation Ei).
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Outside of the limiting case, the difficulties of the verdicts of the
type ‘similarly/differently related to. . . ’ have already been discussed.
They are difficulties inherent to judgments about sameness/differences
of IR, generated by the necessity to make cuts within each of the whole
linguistic structure involving respectively L1 and L2, joined to the fact
that nothing imposes this or that element as constitutive/secondary and
that the choice to focus on certain units instead of others may lead to
antagonist verdicts (cf. sections 5 and 7).
It remains now, first to consider the clause ‘same/different empirical
situations’; and second, to analyse the relation between each of the four
cases (a) to (d) on the one hand, and global verdicts of ‘same/different
CA1’ on the other hand.
8.1. Comparative judgments involving the CA1, discussed in
reference to a circumscribed kind of empirical situation
With respect to the first point, it is important to stress, as MC rightly
points out, that in comparing two rival incommensurable theories, it will
always be possible to identify some empirical situations for which both
T1 and T2 claim responsibility (situations that both the adherents of T1
and T2 think they have to explain). In other words, there will always
be some L1 of T1 and L2 of T2 that will apply to the same empirical
situations (in the minimal sense of being relevant in order to describe
such common Eis).
Such identical empirical situations jointly targeted by T1 and T2 may
be described, at least by an historian of science having the advantage of
an overhanging perspective and mastering both T1 and T2, by means of
a unique ‘observational’ description.
Of course such a description would not be completely theoretically
neutral. It would be neutral only with respect to both T1 and T2. In
other words it would be a description that is sufficiently independent of
the divergent assumptions of T1 and T2. (Such a description is not nec-
essarily a statement that has been actually used by the real practitioners
of science associated with the two studied incommensurable traditions.
It may well be a statement formulated in a meta-language especially
elaborated by the historian for the purpose, a statement that has never
been actually used by scientists but that is nevertheless imputed to them
in the name of the assumption that they would have accepted it) 27.
27I elaborated a similar thesis in [Soler 2003].
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Thus there will always be some pairs of L1-L2, about which it is
possible to say that they are linked to the same empirical situation picked
out by one single actually available observational common description
(like ‘situations of combustion’, ‘movements relative to specified concrete
frames of reference’, etc.).
At first sight this seems to be a necessary condition to conclude that
L1 and L2 do have the same CA1 (with respect to a specified class
of empirical situations). However, the possibility of case (c) incites us
to examine this conclusion a little bit more. Indeed, case (c) could
correspond:
• Either to an extension to newly discovered phenomena of an al-
ready available explanatory scheme (an extension of the domain of
application of the theory, as one commonly says);
• Or to a displacement of an already available explanatory scheme on
phenomena already known, but to which the sketch in question was
not applied until now, and to which other (possibly incompatible)
explanations were previously applied.
Given the flexibility and the polysemy of the verb ‘to apply’, we could
be tempted to say, without going against current usages, that in such a
case, L1 and L2 do have the same CA1 (=similarly apply1), although the
requirement ‘to be linked to the same empirical situation’, that seemed at
first sight to be a pre-condition of the verdict ‘same CA1’, is not fulfilled
(L1 and L2 are here linked to different specified empirical situations).
However, my position is that case (c) is better described under the
label ‘different CA1’. This is because of the fact, already emphasized,
that if we want to be able to maintain a distinction between CA and
IR despite of the circumstance that to specify the CA1 of L requires
to specify some IR of L, then, we have to confer a primary role to the
factual (extra-linguistic, empirical, non-inferential) component targeted
in the CA1’s clause (primary compared with the IR component). Thus
in cases in which L2 is related to empirical situations E2s unknown or
unexplained by T1, and related to these E2 in the same way that L1 is
already related to other empirical situations E1, it seems better to say:
• On the negative side, that L1 and L2 do not have the same CA1
(with respect to the restricted class of the E2s. It of course remains,
on the basis of the multiplicity of such local verdicts, to enounce a
global judgment covering the whole body of the empirical situations
relevant for the adherents of T1 and T2, cf. below).
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• And on the positive side, that L1 and L2 do have similar IR but
different CA1 with respect to the E2s.
Let us admit that the requirement ‘to be related to the same kind of
empirical situation’ is a necessary condition to the judgment ‘to have the
same CA1’. It is, however, of course not a sufficient one. Otherwise we
would have to say that all concepts related in one or in an other respect
to a given isolated empirical situation have the same conditions of appli-
cation! (for ex., mass and length in the Michelson-Morley experiment28).
We need more than this, because L1 and L2 could be related to the same
empirical situations in very different ways (=situation (b)). We need,
furthermore, that L1 and L2 be related to the same empirical situation
in a sufficient similar way — and here we are back to the problem to
decide when we are ready to consider that the two underlying networks
of IR as ‘sufficiently similar’.
On the whole and at a general level I conclude, concerning the rela-
tions between the verdicts of the ‘same/different CA1’-type on the one
hand, and cases (a) to (d) on the other hand, that:
For two linguistic items L1 and L2:
• Cases (a) and (d) obviously correspond, respectively, to judgments
of ‘same CA1’ and ‘different CA1’;
• And cases (b) and (c), at first sight less obvious, are finally better
described as two cases of ‘different CA1’.
8.2. Comparative judgments involving the CA1, discussed in
reference to ‘the whole set of relevant empirical situations’
All this holds in reference to a circumscribed kind of empirical situation.
But let us now consider the judgments of CA1 in reference to the whole
set of the empirical situations that the adherents of T1 and the adherents
of T2 consider to be scientifically relevant.
The relation between the set associated with T1 and the set associated
with T2 is rarely (and probably never for incommensurable theories) a
relation of strict inclusion, let alone one of an identity. There are, in most
28Note that it is precisely in order to avoid such an absurd way of describing the
epistemological situation, that one cannot reduce the relation of application consti-
tutive of CA1 simply to a relation of relevance without any further specifications,
and that one is correlatively almost inescapably inclined, in the analysis of concrete
cases, to understand the CA1-clause in the enlarged sense, namely, to specify, up to
a point, how L is related to the relevant Eis according to T .
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cases, empirical situations Eis to which one of the two incommensurable
theories is related but not the other (where the ‘is related’ may mean
either ‘actually explains’ or ‘has in principle to explain but is not yet
able to do it’).
Let us develop briefly the point.
It seems obvious if we take the later theory T2 as the frame of refer-
ence. Indeed, nobody denies that T2 possesses, at least when considered
on the whole and a long time after its victory on its rival T1, a broader
scope than the earlier theory T1. The theory T2 accounts for empirical
situations and experiences that were either unexplained or even com-
pletely unknown at the time T1 was holding sway.
Yet, although less immediately obvious, the point holds too, at least
locally, if we take T1 as the frame of reference. It corresponds to what
is nowadays commonly referred to as ‘kuhnian losses’: phenomena for
which T1 claims responsibility (and eventually, phenomena that T1 was
believed to explain well), but that the adherents of T2 consider with-
out any relevance (for instance: the colour and the oily-fatty nature of
bodies, with T1 = the phlogiston theory and T2 = the oxygen theory).
If we focus on a particular kind of empirical situation to which L1
of T1 is linked but no L2 of T2 is linked (for ex.: the coloured aspect
of the bodies), we will of course conclude that L1 and L2 do not have
the same CA1. However, judgments of ‘same/different CA1’ are not in
general referred to a single circumscribed class of empirical situations of
the same kind (for example, combustions/coloured aspect of the bodies).
They are, most of the time, global judgments corresponding to a balance
based on a large set of different kind of experiences and observations
(combustions, coloured aspect of the body, plus many other kinds of
experiences for which either T1 and T2 claims responsibility, or only T2,
or only T1).
This introduced a sort of second order difficulty (the first order one
corresponds to the previously analysed ambiguities of the judgments
based on a restricted specified class of empirical situations). Judgments
that L1 and L2 do have (resp. do not have) ‘the same CA1’ rely on an
evaluation of their being grounded on a sufficiently important common
empirical basis (resp. in a too narrow common empirical basis). Yet,
the balance may be delicate, especially for incommensurable theories.
One will of course not be ready to conclude that L1 and L2 have similar
conditions of application, on the grounds that L1 and L2 have the same
CA1 for a given specifiable restricted class of empirical situations, if the
class in question is too poor (is reduced to a few empirical situations,
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or to empirical situations considered by both T1 and T2 as anecdotic
or of secondary importance). But once again, such evaluations engage
an intuitive and inevitably pragmatic component. As a result, their
conclusions are often not consensual, and the arguments underlying them
not uniformly convincing.
Conclusion
MC’s central characterization of incommensurability corresponds to the
following thesis. Kuhn has been right, in his last work, to identify in-
commensurability with untranslatability. Yet such identification needs
to be clarified, and this can be done in the framework of the contextual
theory of meaning. Incommensurable concepts appear then to be de-
fined as concepts translatable with respect to only one or the other, but
never to one and the other, of the two conditions that must be satisfied
in order to obtain a good translation, namely, ‘same CA’ and ‘same IR’.
However, I conclude from the above reflections that MC’s thesis can-
not, unfortunately, be maintained as such. I say ‘unfortunately’, because
the symmetry of MC’s thesis was indeed attractive. But this symmetry
actually lies on a too flexible and permissive usage of the expressions
‘conditions of application’ and ‘preservation of the inferential relations’.
Once having distinguished the CA1 from the CA2, and once having
examined what should be a proper translation according to inferential
relations (= a TIR), this nice symmetry does not resist, and we feel the
need for more fine-grained distinctions in order to grasp the complex and
diverse situations under study.
I have tried to suggest some solutions in this direction, but a lot of
work remains to be done. In the framework of a holistic and contextual
account of the scientific activity, and under the assumption that there is
nothing that can be identified with certainty to absolute and irrefutable
data independent of any way of talking, I think we — historians and
philosophers of science — have to begin with what we have, that is,
with inferential relations underlying statements assumed by each of the
scientific traditions under study. In other words, the IR determinant is,
from the methodological point of view, of primary importance relatively
to the CA (my CA1) determinant. It is only once having exhibited the
two inferential structures (and the two coordinated taxonomies) associ-
ated with each of the two compared theories T1 and T2, that one can
begin to ascribe to certain structural fragments the status of being ‘ob-
servational’ or ‘protocolar’, that one can then characterize the situations
either in terms of CA (CA1) or in terms of ‘pure IR’, and that one can
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ask questions about the preservation of such determinants for key terms
— with all the difficulties and ambiguities emphasized above.
This being admitted, I think that Kuhn’s characterization of (se-
mantic) incommensurability is the good one and the most fundamen-
tal one: incommensurability names the relation between structures and
taxonomies that are not superimposable and that are for this reason not
mutually translatable.
If we want to go further, relying on the CA1 and IR determinants,
it seems that something like the following holds:
• Incommensurable concepts are never translatable according to the
criteria ‘sameness of IR’ (are never TIR) — and here is the main
point of disagreement between MC and me, at least at the level
of general formulations29. The incommensurable concepts are the
ones corresponding to two (on the whole) very different networks
of inferential relations, and as a result, the ones that possess no
good correlate in the rival theory according to the criteria ‘(on the
whole) sufficiently similar IR’.
• As a consequence, incommensurable concepts cannot both apply2
(since they point to incompatible realities).
• However, incommensurable concepts must have some non negligi-
ble fragments of IR in common (otherwise they would not appear
29I say ‘at the level of general formulation’, in the sense that it is only consid-
ering nominal formulations that we find two contradictory claims (my claim that a
translation preserving the IR (=my TIR) is always impossible / MC’s claims that
a translation preserving the IR is sometimes possible). If we go under the nominal
formulations, it is not really a contradiction that we find. What we find is, rather,
that MC actually never performs what I consider as a genuine translation preserving
the IR, that is, a TIR.
The way MC frames the problem of incommensurability, joined to the awareness
that in his second try one is actually not looking for linguistic items satisfying the
clause ‘sameness of IR’, strongly suggests the need of something like a ‘third try’
corresponding to the search for a TIR.
Had MC seriously attempted to follow such a third try, he would certainly have
been led to the difficulties, examined above, constitutive of any comparative judgment
of IR in the framework of an holistic theory. True, MC mentions, in his analysis of the
historical examples, similar patterns of theoretical relations between L1 of T1 and L2
of T2 (for instance, the fact that ‘velocityED’ and ‘velocitySR’ are involved in some
identical mathematical formulas). But such remarks are not exploited as the starting
point of a general methodological discussion concerning the pretension that linguistic
items are analogues with respect to IR; neither are they exploited as premises of
the conclusion according to which certain linguistic items (the non-incommensurable
ones) indeed possess homologue IR (are TIR).
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at first sight as potential candidates for mutual translation, as MC
underlines too — and this is an important point of agreement be-
tween us).
• Moreover, some incommensurable concepts of the so-called incom-
mensurable theories must have the same CA1 (at least in the re-
stricted sense): there must be concepts of T1 and T2 that are simi-
larly linked with — in the minimal sense of ‘being relevant for the
characterization of’ — a non negligible number of identical empir-
ical situations. Otherwise, the two theories T1 and T2 would not
appear as rival incommensurable theories, but as theories about
different separated regions of reality — like for instance hydro-
dynamics and botany. And in that case the claim that T1 and
T2 are incommensurable is neither scandalous nor interesting, and
the comparison between T1 and T2 no longer appears as a crucial
epistemological problem linked to realism and relativism).
With such (indeed incomplete but already far too long) characteri-
zation of incommensurability, we lose the nice symmetry of MC’s con-
clusion. But we gain, I hope, in precision.
Notations
T = any theory.
T 1/T 2 = old/new competing theories.
L = any linguistic item (signifier or group of signifiers
forming an expression or a sentence).
L1/L2 = a linguistic item used in the theoretical context
T1/T2.
ED = electrodynamics.
SR = Special Relativity.
t1/t2 = MC’s first/second try.
t1a/t2a = first step of MC’s first/second try.
t1b/t2b = second step of MC’s first/second try.
CA = conditions of application.
IR = inferential relations.
‘CA1 of L’ (or conditions of application in the first sense)
= ‘empirical situations to which L is linked in the the-
oretical context T ’.
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L applies1 (or applies1 to this or that particular empirical situation)
= L indeed has links to empirical situations (or is in-
deed linked to this or that particular empirical situ-
ation) in the theoretical context T .
‘CA2 of L’ (or conditions of application in the second sense)
= ‘empirical adequacy of the description named L’, ‘ex-
istence of the state of affairs named L’, or ‘truth of
the statement L’ from the viewpoint of a given sub-
ject (most of the time a scientific community in the
context of our discussion).
L applies2
= L has an empirical objective counterpart, L is not
an empty concept (from the viewpoint of a specified
subject).
TIR1(= TIR)
= to look for, within two theories T1 and T2, two lin-
guistic items having the same inferential relations
(items associated with superimposable structures)
= the operation attempted in t1b
= a genuine ‘translation satisfying the condition same
inferential relations’, that can thus be noted TIR.
TIR2(= G)
= to graft, on a linguistic item L1 of T1, a foreign net-
work of IR usually associated with an item L2 in the
theoretical context T2
= the operation attempted in t2a, inadequately de-
scribed as a translation according to IR. What is
done in t2a is not an operation of translation. It can
be better described as a graft (= G) .
Ei = an empirical situation.
Sa = the subject of an application1 (= a linguistic item).
Pa = the point of an application1 (= a set of empirical
situations Eis).
Ra = the relation constitutive of an application1; the kind
of link holding between Sa and Pa.
Eiobj = the objective Eis = empirical situations taken to be
manifestations of the reality under study.
Eimes = the measuring Eis = experimental situations con-
ceived and performed in order to measure some the-
oretical variables.
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CA1obj = CA1 such that Pa = some Eiobj (and correlatively
such that Ra = ‘to be relevant in order to achieve
a sound characterization of the objective situation
under study’).
CA1mes = CA1 such that Pa = some Eimes (and correlatively
such that Ra= ‘to be relevant and reliable in order to
determine the magnitudes involved in some theory’).
IREi = network of the inferential relations underlying the
descriptions of the Eis.
IRDL = network of the inferential relations underlying the
definition (D) or the sense of a theoretical linguistic
item L.
IRB[L−Ei] or IRB
= network of the inferential relations underlying the
description of the way L is linked to the Eis; bridge
relations between theoretical assumptions and obser-
vational states of affairs.
CA1 of L in the restricted/enlarged sense
= CA1 restricted to the specification of the Eis
(=IREi) to which L (=IRDL) applies1 / CA1 un-
derstood as including the additional specification of
the way L is linked to the Eis (=additional specifi-
cation of IRB[L−Ei]).
